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The U.S. Marine Forces Reserve (MFR) in New Orleans is frequently threatened by hurricanes. To protect
the safety of personnel and their families while maintaining mission capability, the Commander must make
timely decisions to set up an alternate headquarters and allow for an orderly evacuation. The MFR relies
on forecasts from the National Hurricane Center, but these forecasts are uncertain, are updated frequently,
and can be difficult to interpret in the context of the MFR’s decision timeline. In addition, there are few
opportunities to learn from experience. We developed the Hurricane Decision Simulator (HDS) to allow MFR
personnel to practice making preparation decisions in the context of many realistic simulated storms and
forecasts, and to develop a better understanding of the decision sequence, the forecast products and their
relationship. The HDS has improved MFR’s training and readiness for hurricane preparation operations and
decision making by enabling more and better focused training and is being extended to other facilities.
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1. Introduction
When hurricanes are active or forecast in the Gulf of Mexico, the Commander of the Marine
Forces Reserves (MFR) must make timely decisions to prepare for a possible evacuation
of the headquarters in New Orleans. While preparation and evacuations are costly, the
consequences of failing to prepare—or of preparing too late—are even more serious. In
this high-stakes decision context, there are many layers of uncertainty about the eventual
outcome.
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The Commander and his top military staff are replaced every two to three years. Seven
Commanders have served MFR since 2000, and they frequently arrive during the peak of
hurricane season, sometimes without experience living in a hurricane-prone region. The
MFR maintains detailed hurricane operations plans and trains annually for operations
during a hurricane threat from decision making through potential evacuation and operation
out of an alternate headquarters. While the details of the implementation of the plan are
spelled out, nowhere is it specified what forecasts should prompt the Commander to make
the decision to proceed to more serious—and costly—preparation actions.
In response to a request from MFR, we developed the Hurricane Decision Simulator
(HDS), an online training tool that lets users step through the MFR’s hurricane decision
process in the context of simulated storms, with forecasts that resemble recent National
Hurricane Center (NHC) forecasts. Unlike other hurricane-preparation training, the HDS
allows the user to make decisions throughout a storm and receive outcome feedback that
depends on her choices and the storm’s impacts.
The HDS includes 339 simulated storms designed to capture both typical and unusual
storm behavior consistent with the historical record, including both hits and misses. The
simulated storms were generated such that the threat to New Orleans is high enough that
they would be monitored by the MFR Commander. The HDS allows an individual user to
step through a storm in about 15 minutes. Since real storms posing a similar threat level
occur on average approximately once per year, users can gain decades’ worth of simulated
experience in a day.
The MFR has used the HDS in individual training and for group tabletop exercises,
and the emergency management staff and senior decision makers find it very useful. It
provides more training opportunities, saves time in preparing and executing trainings,
provides a more realistic experience of uncertainty, and improves their understanding of
forecast products. The MFR has requested that we create versions for the Marines’ Reserve
Training Centers in other vulnerable locations on the Gulf and Atlantic coasts.
The prior literature on hurricane preparedness and response decision making can be
generally divided into three areas: (i) helping authorities determine if and when to evacuate
communities, (ii) descriptive models of people’s decisions to evacuate and return, and (iii)
guidance and optimization models pre-positioning and delivering emergency relief supplies.
Operations research models can provide useful guidance to emergency managers (Larson
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et al. 2006) and help public officials determine how to trade off risks to life against the cost
of false alarms when considering whether to evacuate a community (Lindell and Prater
2007, Regnier 2008, Kailiponi 2010, Apivatanagul et al. 2012). Even if an evacuation is
ordered, a number of geographic, sociodemographic, and communication and risk factors
influence behavior regarding if, when, and how to leave (Baker 1991, Dow and Cutter 1998,
Gladwin et al. 2001, Kang et al. 2007, Smith and McCarty 2009, Hasan et al. 2010, Lindell
et al. 2011, Lindell and Perry 2012) and when to return after a hurricane (Siebeneck and
Cova 2008, 2012, Siebeneck et al. 2013). Optimization can help inform officials where to
best pre-position emergency relief supplies (Salmero´n and Apte 2010, Taskin and Lodree
2011, Uichanco 2016), but damaged infrastructure due to the hurricane can impede the
delivery of those supplies (Holgu´ın-Veras et al. 2007, Horner and Widener 2011). The HDS
and this article contribute to this literature by providing decision training for a single
organization, the MFR. Rather than optimizing the decision for officials, this article focuses
on how officials can benefit from practicing making preparedness decisions in a simulated
environment.
This article describes the HDS and how it is being used by the MFR to improve its
operations management during a hurricane threat. Section 2 provides background on the
MFR’s decision context, the need for training aids, and a review of relevant literature.
Section 3 describes the HDS and its development. The HDS has three primary components:
decisions selected by the user, simulated storms, and outcomes based on the user’s decisions
and the storm’s behavior. Section 4 describes the benefits that MFR has experienced by
using the HDS. Concluding remarks and the potential future uses of such a simulation-
based training environment for managing hurricane preparation operations are discussed
in Section 5.
2. Background
When a hurricane—or a tropical storm that is forecast to strengthen into a hurricane—
is active in the Gulf of Mexico, the MFR Commander monitors the storm to determine
whether and when to prepare to evacuate and transfer operations to an alternate head-
quarters. While the consequences of failing to act or acting too late can be deadly, false
alarms are also costly, both financially and in terms of mission disruption. The high stakes
are coupled with multi-dimensional and multi-layer uncertainty about the impacts to the
MFR, which pose a challenge to judgemental decision making make it difficult to gain
expertise.
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2.1. Hurricanes and MFR
A hurricane is a tropical cyclone with sustained (1-minute) winds exceeding 74 mph, but
in some cases reaching 190 mph.1 Hurricane-force winds can cause structural damage and
are dangerous to people in inadequate shelter,2 but flooding due to precipitation and
storm surge is more deadly than winds (Rappaport 2014). Hurricanes can also disable local
services such as power and water, and streets can become impassable due to flooding, fallen
trees, and other debris.
The topography of southeast Louisiana makes the region particularly vulnerable to flood-
ing. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina killed approximately 1,200 people, damaged or destroyed
about 300,000 houses (Townsend 2006), and caused a total of $198 billion in damages
(Blake et al. 2011) in Louisiana and nearby parts of Mississippi. While Katrina is the
most widely known Louisiana hurricane, three other hurricanes that hit Louisiana are also
among the top ten most deadly in U.S. history (Blake et al. 2011).
The MFR is headquartered in New Orleans, adjacent to the Mississippi River and less
than 10 feet above sea level. The facility is also the headquarters for the Marine Forces
Northern Command. The MFR must be ready to deploy to reinforce and support the active
duty Marine forces, and the Northern Command conducts homeland security operations
and supports U.S. civilian authorities. A single general serves as the Commander of the two
organizations and they are headquartered in the same facility. For simplicity, we refer to
them collectively as the MFR. The headquarters facility was built to withstand hurricane
conditions, has backup power systems and supplies, and is located within the protection of
the levee system. However, in the event of severe impacts such as flooding and the loss of
services, the MFR would transfer its operations to an alternate headquarters to ensure full
mission capability. Moreover, the MFR is responsible for its personnel and their families’
safety, and many of them live outside the levee system.
The MFR maintains a Hurricane Evacuation and Continuity of Operations Plan that
formally documents the decisions and the actions necessary to evacuate the current head-
quarters and relocate to an alternate headquarters at an inland facility. Three timelines
(matrices) are included in this document. The Decision Support Matrix (DSM) and the
Hurricane Condition Matrix recommend key decisions for the Commander. These decisions
1 http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/E1.html, accessed August 25, 2015.
2 http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshws.php, accessed August 25, 2015.
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are tied to approximately 150 implementation actions that MFR must take to maintain
continuity of operations and protect personnel and their families, documented in the Exe-
cution Matrix. The implementation actions take time, which drives the decision timeline.
Like many military organizations, the MFR commonly uses backwards planning with a
deterministic timeline (e.g., D-Day, with D-1 indicating one day before D-Day, etc.) to plan
its operations. Similarly, the DSM is based on the number of hours before the arrival of
hurricane-force winds. According to the plan, key decisions should be made 48 to 96 hours
before tropical-storm force winds reach the New Orleans area. The plan treats the time
until storm impacts arrive as deterministic. Although the Commander’s decisions about
whether to implement more serious—and costly—levels of preparation are based on the
best available forecasts, neither the DSM nor the Execution Matrix specifies the precise
forecast conditions that should prompt each level of preparation.
Although the hurricane operations plans provide important information to Comman-
der and his emergency management staff and enable rapid implementation of hurricane
preparation actions when ordered, they do not explicitly account for the uncertainty in
storm forecasts. While NHC forecast errors have improved dramatically in recent years,3
high-probability hurricane forecasts are very rare for the key decision lead times of 48 to
96 hours before the onset of tropical-storm force winds specified in the DSM.
For example, in 2012, Hurricane Isaac made landfall in Louisiana and at the same time
tropical-storm force winds reached the city. However, 66 hours earlier, the storm was fore-
cast to make landfall in the Florida panhandle, about 230 miles from its eventual landfall
location. During the next 18 hours, the forecast track moved over Louisiana, which led the
MFR to deploy the advance emergency relocation staff (ERS) just 36 hours before landfall,
and the team was caught in severe traffic.
Figure 1 shows the probabilities of Hurricane Isaac’s winds exceeding various thresholds
at New Orleans coupled with the DSM timeline for four of the key decisions. Understand-
ably, the MFR’s after-action report indicated that in the future, they would like to be
able to initiate action with more lead time. However, as in the case of Isaac, the threat
may not appear sufficient to justify costly preparation at the longer lead times. Hurricane
3 Average NHC Atlantic Track Forecast Errors for tropical storms and hurricanes, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/
verification/pdfs/1970-present_OFCL_ATL_annual_trk_errors_noTDs.pdf, accessed September 8, 2016. Note
distances are in nautical rather than statute miles.
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Figure 1 National Hurricane Center forecasts of the probability of winds exceeding three thresholds at New
Orleans during the 120 hours following the forecast for Hurricane Isaac. The horizontal axis shows the
issue time of the forecast, in hours before 7 p.m. August 28, 2012, when the storm made landfall
in Louisiana. The planned timing of four of the key decisions are shown, together with timing of the
late movement of the track. The ERS is the Emergency Response Staff and C2 is the abbreviation for
Command and Control.
preparation timelines can also be compressed because storms can form very quickly. In
2007, Humberto formed in the Gulf of Mexico just south of Louisiana and made landfall
as a hurricane approximately 16 hours after the first public advisory from NHC.
2.2. Decision context
In the 20th century, forecasts with lead times sufficient for evacuation have dramatically
lowered the hurricane death rate. Forecasting organizations within the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), in particular the NHC, generate most of the
underlying forecast information for the North Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern
North Pacific. Local National Weather Service offices and commercial forecasters get much
of their information from the NHC.
When a tropical storm is active in its area of responsibility, the NHC forecasts its track
(center positions), intensity (maximum 1-minute sustained winds), and size (wind radii).
An example of the forecast track for 2012’s Hurricane Isaac is shown in Figure 2c, together
Author: Hurricane Decision Simulator
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with a track forecast cone that encompasses the likely future positions of the storm center.
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Figure 3 Schematic representation of layers of uncertainty in hurricane forecast interpretation.
Several layers of uncertainty make the hurricane-preparation decision context challeng-
ing. As represented in the center (white) rectangle in Figure 3, the variables that NHC
forecasts do not match those of direct consequence to MFR. The impacts that directly
threaten MFR personnel and operations are flooding in the immediate area and disruption
of local services, such as power, drinking water, and security. Of these variables, the NHC
only forecasts flooding, and currently it issues no storm-specific surge or flooding forecasts
with more than 48 hours’ lead time, at which point, according to the DSM, the MFR
should have completed its evacuation and decided to transfer command and control (C2)
to the alternate headquarters.4 Because the plan is driven by the storm’s lead time, the
time until impacts is also very important. However, the NHC does not officially forecast
landfall. Their text products sometimes (but not always) provide a window for landfall or
for the arrival of tropical-storm force winds, but rarely more than 24 hours before impact.
The NHC does forecast several variables highly related to the direct impacts—the storm’s
center positions, its size, and its intensity are highly related to winds experienced at New
Orleans. However, the relationship is multidimensional and includes variability, limiting
the decision maker’s ability to accurately judge the local impact (Stewart and Lusk 1994).
There is evidence that many users have trouble translating the forecast products into an
assessment of their direct impacts.
For example, in conversations with local officials, we have found that many prefer to
use the track forecast cone as the basis for evacuation decisions, ordering an evacuation if
4 http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/surge/products.php accessed September 8, 2016.
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their region is inside the track forecast cone. Broad et al. (2007) cites many instances of
forecast users relying on the cone (see Figure 2c) to encompass the entire area that may
experience impacts. This is consistent with our experience with local officials throughout
the southeast. However, the cone does not show the extent of the storm’s impact. The
cone’s size depends only on average track errors, and would be similar for a large, intense
hurricane like Katrina, whose maximum intensity was 175 mph, and for a small tropical
storm.
Another example of imperfect interpretation of forecasts is the belief that wind-speed
is a highly valid predictor of storm surge. As described earlier, storm surge is a more
common killer than high winds, yet many people expect the relationship between storm
intensity and storm surge to be much closer than it is. While the NHC emphasizes that
storm intensity is only loosely associated with storm surge,5 many users including local
emergency managers refer to storm surge as a direct function of wind speed (e.g. “expect
a Category 2 storm surge”’) and there are many instances of similar advice being offered.6
A second layer of uncertainty is represented in the striped rectangle in Figure 3—the
storm’s actual outcome differs from what is forecast. The difference is called forecast error.
Based on the 2010-2015 seasons, average track errors range from about 85 miles for the
48-hour lead time to 181 miles for the 96-hour lead time. Average intensity errors range
from 15 mph at the 48-hour lead time to 17 mph for the 96-hour lead time.7
Like most hurricane preparation plans, the MFR’s DSM effectively treats lead time
as deterministic. Although the NHC does not forecast landfall and therefore does not
systematically provide information about landfall timing uncertainty, Powell and Aberson
(2001) found that implied time-to-landfall forecasts were in error by an average of over 12
hours in the 55-72 hour lead time.
In 2006, the NHC began issuing a probability forecast for winds exceeding 39 mph
(tropical-storm force), 58 mph (destructive force), and 74 mph (hurricane-force) (DeMaria
et al. 2009). This product integrates the uncertainty associated with track, intensity, and
size error to estimate the probability of winds exceeding each threshold at each location
5 http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/surge/surge_intro.pdf, accessed January 25, 2017
6 For example https://www.hurricanezone.net/articles/saffirsimpsonscale.html, accessed January 17, 2017.
7 http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/verification/pdfs/1990-present_OFCL_ATL_annual_int_errors.pdf, accessed
September 8, 2016.
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within the next 120 hours. Examples from 2012’s Hurricane Isaac are shown for the 39 and
74-mph thresholds in Figures 2a and 2b.
A third layer of uncertainty, represented in the gray shaded rectangle in Figure 3, is
the dynamic nature of the forecasts. The NHC’s forecasts change at least every six hours
because they are updated to reflect the most recent available information. Generally, their
accuracy improves with each update. However, this means that the forecast issued six or
more hours earlier does not match the current forecast. The psychology literature (Gneezy
1996, Johnson and Busemeyer 2001, Kunreuther et al. 2002) indicates that people are
uncomfortable with multistage probabilities (called ambiguity), and that forecast changes
may introduce additional biases, such as anchoring and other order effects in hurricane
risk judgements and preparation decisions (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992).
Finally, as represented in the outer, dotted rectangle in Figure 3, the information avail-
able and its quality changes from one hurricane season to the next. The NHC’s forecast
accuracy has been improving throughout its history. For example, the average track error
for the 48-hour forecast has declined from about 119 miles in the 2000-2009 period to 85
miles in the 2010-2015 period. Therefore the distribution of forecast errors changes. Even
the types of products available change regularly. For example, in the 2017 season, the NHC
will add time-of-arrival contours to its wind-speed probability product, and extent-of-wind
swaths to its cone graphic.8 The real-world experience with forecast products that decision
makers gain can become outdated by the following season.
A large body of psychology research shows that people have trouble assessing uncer-
tainty due to cognitive biases (Tversky et al. 1982), other psychological factors such as
affect (Slovic 1987), and motivational biases such as optimism (Armor and Taylor 2002).
Moreover, the more predictive information is available and the more distant the predictors’
relationship to the target judgement, the worse people perform (Stewart and Lusk 1994).
People often do not process probabilistic information well (Tversky et al. 1982), and their
interpretation of probabilities depends on how the information is presented (Ibrekk and
Morgan 1987, Harding et al. 1982, Halpern et al. 1989).
Experience can improve intuitive judgement (Hogarth 2001, Klein 2015), but the factors
that make the hurricane preparation decision challenging—many environmental variables,
8 J. Franklin, Branch Chief, Hurricane Specialist Unit, NOAA/NWS/National Hurricane Center, personal communi-
cation, January 11, 2017.
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frequent forecast updates, substantial irreducible environmental uncertainty, high-stakes
decisions, and time pressure—also make it more difficult for people to learn through expe-
rience (Shanteau 1992, Brehmer 1980, Ericsson 2006, Kahneman and Klein 2009). Expe-
rience with prior storms can also affect hurricane preparation decision making (Trumbo
et al. 2011), possibly for the worse (Dillon et al. 2011, Meyer et al. 2013). Hindsight bias in
evaluating predictability (Fischhoff and Beyth 1975), outcome bias in evaluating decision
quality (Baron and Hershey 1988) and recency bias (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992) could
influence individuals to overemphasize these few examples—effectively, as Marines would
put it, preparing for the last war. Yet every storm is different, and MFR cannot count on
perfect forecasts.
There are far too few tropical storms to allow emergency managers to develop high-
performing intuitive judgement based on personal experience alone. On average, fewer than
10 tropical cyclones per year arise in the North Atlantic, and only about 60% of those will
make landfall (Landsea 2007). Moreover, most of these will not become hurricanes, and
only about one or two will be Category 3 or higher (Landsea 1993), which is considered
the threshold for evacuating the city of New Orleans. On average one Category 3 or higher
hurricane makes landfall at New Orleans every 23 years (Blake et al. 2011). Even a manager
nearing the end of a 30-year career would not experience enough storms to develop a highly
reliable intuitive judgement about hurricane preparation decisions.
2.3. Computer-Based Simulations for Training
Given the uncertainties involved with making decisions prior to a hurricane and the infre-
quency of a hurricane event, the MFR requested assistance in developing training tools.
Computer simulations are increasingly being used to train decision makers in operations
management. Simulation is used to teach important principles such as the bull whip effect
(Pasin and Giroux 2011), Kanban systems (Baranauskas et al. 2000), capacity utilization
(Johnson and Drougas 2002), lean manufacturing (Wan et al. 2008), and logistics (Battini
et al. 2009). Simulation seems to be a valuable learning tool because users can connect
learning to a real-world experience (Faria and Dickinson 1994, Haapasalo and Hyvnen 2001,
Lainema and Hilmola 2005), can receive feedback on their decisions (Bakken et al. 1992,
Faria and Dickinson 1994), and can learn from their mistakes in a risk-free environment
(Faria and Dickinson 1994, Baker et al. 2005, Adobor and Daneshfar 2006, Salas et al.
2009). Emergency response teams are increasingly training via simulations (Crichton et al.
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2000), and integrating gaming and simulation provides a means for emergency responders
to train together as a team (Jain and McLean 2005).
Project Ensayo (Becerra-Ferna´ndez et al. 2007, 2008, Nikolai et al. 2009) has developed
a virtual emergency operations center to train Florida officials to respond to disasters such
as hurricanes. It is focused on implementation—knowing what to do and how to do it—
rather than on the decisions, and its experience is team-based, not individual. In addition,
its scope extends beyond hurricanes.
MetEd9 provides educational resources on tropical-storm forecasting that are designed
for forecasters but are sometimes used by emergency managers. Some of these resources
contain a scenario in which a user steps through a chronological sequence of forecast
updates. Since there is only one scenario and one way to progress through the scenario, the
user receives immediate feedback on the correct answer. There is only one path through
the experience.
The HDS, on the other hand, is designed for an individual user or a group to train
on making critical hurricane preparation decisions using many simulated storms. Like a
choose-your-own adventure book or a video game, it allows the user to take many paths
through any storm, with decision-specific feedback. The HDS offers several unique contri-
butions to the operations management and decision-training literature, in particular the
possibility of multiple experiences of a dynamic, multistage decision under uncertainty in
a realistic context.
3. Hurricane Decision Simulator
The MFR reached out to the Naval Postgraduate School in 2014 looking for tools to help
with hurricane preparation decision making. The previous August, a new Commander had
taken over responsibility for the lives and mission of the MFR and Marine Forces Northern
Command on the eighth anniversary of Hurricane Katrina. Like many Commanders, he
had not previously lived in the hurricane-prone Gulf region. At that time, their senior
leaders and emergency managers prepared for hurricanes with annual tabletop exercises,
using one simulated storm in each exercise. We proposed developing a simulator to give
MFR personnel practice in understanding the NHC weather forecasts, interpreting the
probabilistic information, and making decisions in advance of a hurricane.
9 https://www.meted.ucar.edu/, accessed September 7, 2016.
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The HDS is a computer-based tool, available online,10 that steps the user through the
evolution of a simulated storm, showing forecasts and storm impacts. The forecast is
updated at time steps representing six hours of real-world time, which corresponds to the
NHC update schedule.
The user is asked to make decisions regarding preparation and evacuation based on the
updated forecasts. The HDS provides a realistic learning environment for a Commander,
senior officer, or emergency manager, who can practice on several simulated storms in only
one hour.
3.1. User Decisions
A simulation starts with the formation of a storm in the Gulf or approximately 120 hours
before the expected landfall for storms forming far from New Orleans. The HDS first
displays a window describing the history of the storm to that point. Once the user dismisses
the history window, the HDS shows the first forecast and asks the user the first of six
decision questions as seen in Figure 4. The six key decisions are shown in Table 1 with
DSM-specified lead times. Although the DSM specifies that the first decision should be
made 96 hours before the arrival of hurricane-force winds, the user is given the opportunity
to make the first decision at every update starting as much as 120 hours before predicted
landfall.
If the user replies “No,” to any question, the HDS provides the next forecast update and
repeats the decision question. As illustrated in Figure 5, if she chooses “Yes”, she proceeds
through the sequence of decisions until she chooses “No” or takes all preparatory actions,
including transferring C2. The HDS records user decisions and incorporates their timing
in determining the outcomes of the simulation.
While the decisions must be taken in sequence, the preparation actions can be made at
any time during the simulation. This can result in a timeline that is compressed relative to
the DSM. As in the case of Hurricane Isaac, changes in the forecast indicating an increased
risk to New Orleans due to changing forecast track, speed, or intensity can create this
compressed timeline. While the HDS provides a forecast time-to-landfall, this time does
not decline by precisely six hours in every time step, reflecting the uncertainty in track
forecasts, which causes uncertainty in the critical time-to-landfall variable.
10 http://eddy.nps.edu/hurricaneSim/simulation, accessed September 10, 2016. An earlier, laptop-based version
is described in MacKenzie and Regnier (2015).
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Table 1 Key decisions according to the MFR DSM
Decision Recommended hours before landfall
Deploy the advance ERS to the alternate headquarters 96
Deploy liaison officers to local municipalities’ emergency operations centers 96
Deploy the rest of the ERS to the alternate headquarters 72
Activate personnel who will remain behind after the evacuation 72
Order evacuation or shelter in place at 60 hours before landfall 72
Transfer C2 to alternate headquarters 48
Figure 4 Decision prompt in the Hurricane Decision Simulator. ADVON stands for advance ERS.
The Record of Events at the left of the user interface (see Figures 4 and 7) details actions
that must be taken by MFR and Marine Forces Northern Command. Some of these actions
are triggered by the user’s decisions, and some are triggered by storm conditions. This
information provides a rich and realistic context and helps and familiarize users with the
hurricane operations procedures. For example, if the user decides to deploy the advance
ERS, 12 simulated hours later, the HDS announces with a popup message that the ERS
arrived at the alternate headquarters and has begun to establish communications.
The HDS also provides information on actions taken by local and state authorities that
may affect MFR outcomes. If the city begins an evacuation, it plans to begin evacuating
its less mobile citizens about 60 hours before landfall, assuming the decision can be made
in time. The state of Louisiana’s evacuation plan is also time dependent. Areas south
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Figure 5 Decision tree representation of the dynamic decision problem represented in the HDS.
of the Intracoastal Waterway outside the levee protection plan to begin evacuation 50
hours before landfall. Areas south of the Mississippi River which are levee protected but
remain vulnerable plan to begin evacuation 40 hours before landfall. The rest of New
Orleans begins to evacuate 30 hours before landfall, and contraflow is implemented. The
HDS provides immediate announcements when these evacuations are ordered, and provides
outcomes dependent on state and local decisions. For example, if the user waits to order
an evacuation of MFR until the time that New Orleans orders the evacuation, the post-
simulation feedback reports that MFR personnel are caught in traffic, and their arrival to
the alternate headquarters may be delayed by 24 hours or more. Local and state actions
and consequences were developed based on interviews with local officials and planning
documents.
3.2. Simulated Storms
In order to give users the opportunity to experience decades’ worth of storms in a few hours,
the HDS requires hundreds of distinct simulated storms. They must be realistic enough
to increase users’ confidence in the learning value of the tool. As described in Section 2.2,
uncertainty in the future behavior of the storm is an important feature of the decision
context. Therefore, the simulated storms need to span the diversity of possible storm and
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forecast behavior so that users encounter not just typical storms but also realistic storms
with unexpected behavior.
The objectives of realism and diversity can be conflicting, which poses a modeling chal-
lenge. The goal is to reflect typical behavior with a realistic degree of unexpected behavior.
Figure 6 shows real and simulated storms, side-by-side with actual track and forecast tracks
shown. The storm in Figure 6a shows 2011’s Tropical Storm Lee, which, like Humberto,
formed close to shore. Unlike Humberto, it did not quite reach hurricane strength, but it
did pass close to New Orleans. Many residents of the Gulf coast are surprised that this can
happen, and the long-lead hurricane preparation plans do not account for this eventuality.
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(a) Tropical Storm Lee, 2011 (b) HDS simulated storm
(c) Hurricane Isaac, 2012 (d) HDS simulated storm.
(e) Hurricane Noel, 2007 (f) HDS simulated storm
Figure 6 Real (left) and simulated (right) storms. Actual track is shown in red, forecast tracks are shown in
blue, and notional 39, 58, and 74-mph wind swaths are shown in shades of gray.
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3.2.1. Storm model Statistical storm models generally summarize typical or central
behavior. For example, linear models such as CLIPER (for climatology and persistence)
models are among those used to predict track (Aberson 1998), intensity (Knaff et al. 2003),
and radius (Knaff et al. 2007). They estimate the expected value of the target variable.
The estimation of such a model also produces error statistics, which could be used to
generate simulated storm tracks by generating random deviations from the central forecast.
However, deviations from centrality are correlated over time, and such correlations would
need to be captured to produce realistic tracks. Moreover, the correlations are themselves
a function of predictor variables such as latitude, intensity, and whether the storm center
is over land.
Rather than specify a complex error model, we follow Regnier and Harr (2006) and
Emanuel et al. (2006), in using a first-order discrete-time Markovian model to generate the
simulated storm’s track (its center positions). The model is fit using NHC historical track
data from 14,882 observations of 542 storms from 1980 to 2014 as found in the NHC’s
best-track database (Jarvinen et al. 1984). Observations are in six-hour time increments,
and each consists of the storm’s
center position (latitude and longitude in 0.1◦ increments), intensity (velocity of maxi-
mum sustained winds in 5-kt increments), and size (radius of maximum winds in nautical
miles). Size is not always available.
The states in the Markov model are defined using a k-means clustering algorithm with
the following normalized variables for each observation: (i) intra-cluster great-circle dis-
tances in the current period, (ii) intra-cluster great-circle distances six hours later, (iii)
the speed of forward motion, and (iv) a binary variable indicating if the storm center is
over land. Each cluster defines a state in the Markov model. The mean latitude, longi-
tude, intensity, and radius of maximum winds are calculated for each cluster and used to
determine the wind speed at New Orleans for a storm in this modeled state.
The transition probabilities among states are proportional to the observed frequency of
transitioning from one state to another state in the data set, or dissipating in the next
time period. The transition matrix is used to calculate the probability that hurricane-force
(79-mph) winds will eventually affect New Orleans, conditional on the state.
Although the vast majority of tropical cyclones tracked by NHC never threaten New
Orleans, the purpose of the HDS is to provide experience with storms that would require
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active attention of the Commander of MFR. Tracks of interest to MFR are generated by
selecting states in which the probability of the storm with hurricane-force winds affects New
Orleans is at least 5%. Because they are designed to be much more likely than an arbitrary
storm to affect New Orleans, they tend to be larger and more intense. However, their paths
and forecast errors are representative of real storms in the Gulf area, as seen in Figure
6. Consistent with reality, most of the storms in the HDS do not produce hurricane-force
winds at New Orleans.
The storm’s intensity and size are generated using linear models. The storm’s intensity
begins with the cluster mean intensity, and six-hour changes are generated from a normal
distribution with a mean and standard deviation derived from a linear regression with the
current latitude, current intensity, the prior period’s change in intensity, and the overland
indicator variable as predictors. The storm’s size is similarly modeled via linear regression
of six-hour changes predicted on current intensity, current size, and the overland indicator,
with size change applied with a 50% probability in each period.
3.2.2. Forecasts At each update, the HDS displays forecast products that replicate
many of the NHC’s products:11
• a map showing the forecast track, overlaid with a cone showing the region where the
storm’s center position is likely to fall;
• maps showing the probability of winds exceeding each of three thresholds (39 mph,
58 mph, and 74 mph) in the next 120 hours following the update (Examples are shown in
Figures 7a - 7c);
• a text-based update, shown in summary form overlaid on the maps, which may be
expanded to show a narrative description of the forecast (see Figure 7d), similar to NHC’s
text-based advisories.
To produce these products, for every six hours of the storm’s progress it needs new
forecasts. Each forecast includes lead times of 12, 24, 36, 48, 72, 96, and 120 hours,12
unless the storm is forecast to dissipate earlier. Figure 7 shows updated forecasts—7c is
identical to 7a except it reflects a later update. Each forecast must be consistent with the
11 In addition to the examples in Figure 2, the remaining forecasts for 2012’s Hurricane Isaac can be viewed at http:
//www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2012/ISAAC_graphics.shtml for the maps and http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/
2012/ISAAC.shtml for the text products.
12 Longer lead forecasts are not simulated as MFR decisions are made with less than 120 hours’ lead time, and the
error data are very sparse at longer lead times.
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simulated storm’s actual events and presented in a format similar to recent NHC forecast
products. The simulated forecast errors should be similar to their real counterparts so that
the intuition users gain about risky decisions in the HDS is relevant to a real storm in the
upcoming season.
The simulated forecasts are generated by starting with the simulated actual values of
the four variables for the storm, and adding errors generated from distributions similar
to NHC forecast error distributions during the most recent five years for which data were
available (2010-2014).13 This is consistent with NHC’s practice of reporting error statistics
for the most recent five years to balance the value of reflecting the latest forecasting
processes against the value of a larger data set in order to reduce the impact of inter-storm
and inter-seasonal variability. As NHC forecast accuracy improves over time, simulated
forecasts in the HDS should be replaced with forecasts whose errors correspond to the most
recent NHC errors in order to maintain consistency between simulated forecasts and real
forecasts. Table 2 summarizes the track errors for the last ten years from NHC,14 together
with the HDS track errors for comparison. While track errors are generated using a Monte
Carlo approach, with distributional parameters matching those of NHC’s along-track and
cross-track errors from the 2010-2014 period, the HDS track errors are reasonably close in
both mean and standard deviation to errors observed during the 2015 and 2016 seasons.
To make the forecasts realistic, the correlations among forecast errors must be realistic.
For a given forecast update, track errors tend to be positively correlated across lead times.
For example, if the 36-hour forecast speed is very fast (slow), the 48-hour forecast speed is
also likely to be very fast (slow). Errors are also positively correlated across updates. For
example, if Monday morning’s forecast of Wednesday morning’s position is too far west,
it is likely that Tuesday morning’s forecast of Wednesday morning’s position is also too
far west. Since a given storm could have 20 or more updates before it makes landfall or
dissipates, and each update has forecasts at seven lead times, there are well over 100 inter-
correlated errors per variable in each storm. The error data set is too small to estimate
a good covariance matrix for all the forecast errors. Therefore for track (the latitude and
longitude variables), the 72-hour forecasts for all updates are simulated from a multivari-
ate normal distribution with a covariance matrix correlated at 0.9 for adjacent updates,
13 downloaded March 6 and 7, 2015 from http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/verification/verify7.shtml.
14 calculated using NHC error data downloaded September 22, 2017 from http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/verification/
verify7.shtml.
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Table 2 Comparison of recent NHC track errors with HDS track errors. Average (standard deviation) of errors
are in nautical miles.
Forecast lead time (hours)
year 12 24 36 48 72 96 120
2007 33 (22) 51 (32) 71 (43) 92 (47) 146 (74) 167 (110) 258 (153)
2008 28 (18) 48 (32) 69 (46) 88 (61) 127 (79) 160 (97) 192 (111)
2009 30 (22) 45 (29) 62 (36) 73 (33) 119 (54) 198 (79) 292 (116)
2010 34 (22) 53 (32) 70 (42) 88 (55) 129 (76) 166 (104) 187 (127)
2011 28 (17) 43 (28) 57 (36) 71 (43) 110 (78) 167 (106) 245 (146)
2012 25 (16) 40 (25) 54 (35) 69 (48) 101 (79) 143 (87) 194 (103)
2013 28 (19) 49 (31) 72 (39) 103 (58) 141 (123) 166 (125) 165 (69)
2014 26 (20) 38 (23) 51 (32) 65 (41) 100 (70) 162 (91) 279 (213)
2015 25 (16) 40 (25) 56 (37) 77 (59) 125 (107) 188 (178) 241 (191)
2016 24 (14) 36 (23) 48 (32) 62 (43) 89 (53) 133 (67) 168 (91)
HDS 27 (14) 36 (19) 35 (20) 54 (28) 75 (56) 141 (78) 207 (118)
and each variable’s variance matches the data set. For each update, the forecast errors
(from which forecasts are calculated) are generated from a multivariate normal distribu-
tion matching the previously generated 72-hour errors, using the covariance matrix of the
historical forecast errors. Intensity errors are generated similarly. Some features, such as
estimated time-to-landfall, require forecasts for smaller time intervals, which are interpo-
lated between the above-listed lead times. Each update includes a forecast of the expected
time-to-landfall for the storm, which is estimated by assuming the current forecast track is
correct and calculating the time steps until the track crosses the U.S. coastline along the
Gulf of Mexico.
The wind-speed probability forecasts are one of the most important of NHC’s forecast
products. For the HDS, wind-speed probability forecasts were generated by Charles R.
Sampson of the Naval Research Laboratory in Monterey using the same code used by the
NHC. Three maps—for the 39-mph, 58-mph, and 74-mph thresholds—are shown in the
HDS, and the user can switch among maps using the buttons at the top of the map (see
Figure 7). The wind-speed probability forecasts for New Orleans are also given in the text
product, and shown in the detail view in Figure 7d.
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3.3. User Feedback
After the storm makes landfall or dissipates, the HDS provides narrative feedback in a
Results/Feedback window. At the top, a Results section describes direct storm impacts,
such as the flood level and wind speeds, as well as indirect impacts such as damage to
physical infrastructure. This section also summarizes the decisions taken and their timing.
Next, a Feedback section, as shown in Figure 8, describes outcomes resulting from the
user’s decisions, including the effects of the relative timing of the decisions. The outcome
model is based on our discussions with MFR subject matter experts, including representa-
tives from the personnel, operations, logistics, and communications departments in MFR.
Each decision can incur monetary costs, disrupt normal operations, or create difficulties
for MFR in completing other operations. The benefits of preparation are mitigating the
consequences of a hurricane if it does reach New Orleans. Subject matter experts at MFR
were asked to describe how decisions would impact costs and benefits for different size
storms. Outcomes are a function of the decisions taken by the user and the severity of the
storm.
One of the outcomes displayed in the Feedback section is the monetary cost of the user’s
decisions. The subject matter experts revealed that three decisions incur monetary costs:
(i) deploying the advance ERS, (ii) deploying the rest of the ERS, and (iii) evacuating
the MFR headquarters. The decisions to deploy the advance ERS and the rest of the ERS
cost relatively little and are represented as fixed costs in the HDS: $125,000 total. The
estimated cost of evacuating the MFR headquarters is $300,000 for each day that MFR is
evacuated. MFR subject matter experts estimated that if a hurricane does not reach New
Orleans, MFR personnel could return about 3 days after the storm ends. If a hurricane
reaches New Orleans, MFR personnel could return in 3-7 days, but it could be as many as
14 days before personnel return. In the Feedback section, the HDS provides verbal feedback
“A return to New Orleans will likely be scheduled in 3-7 days, but it could be as many as
14 days before people can return.” to give the user a sense of the variability and estimates
the cost of a 10-day post-hurricane evacuation period. For example, if a user orders an
evacuation 72 hours (i.e., 3 days) before a storm dissipates and no hurricane strikes New
Orleans, the HDS calculates that the total monetary cost is $125,000 + $300,000(3 + 3) =
$1,925,000. If the user makes the same decision but a hurricane strikes New Orleans, the
cost is $125,000 + $300,000(3 + 10) = $4,025,000.
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Figure 8 Results/Feedback window in the Hurricane Decision Simulator, scrolled down to show Feedback.
Some outcomes depend only on the relative timing of decisions. For example, the advance
ERS is supposed to be deployed to the alternate headquarters 36 hours before an evacuation
is ordered. If the advance ERS is deployed late, the staff might not have time to set up
the alternate headquarters, and there is a risk that some mission-essential functions may
not be performed, at least initially. This information is provided to the user if the user
compresses the timeline in the HDS, as seen in the Feedback section shown in Figure 8.
The Feedback section also describes outcomes that are a function of the user’s decisions,
their timing, and the storm impacts. For example, if the decision to evacuate is taken too
late, the user receives feedback stating that personnel were in danger on the roads during
tropical-storm force winds or flooding. Thus, the user can begin to understand the impact
of uncertainty in time-to-landfall.
The most important outcomes that depend on both decisions and the storm are the
consequences of severe weather that could have been avoided by preparation. Eliciting
information about some of these outcomes was perhaps the most difficult part of building
the HDS because MFR leadership was hesitant to describe what might happen if the DSM
and Execution Matrix were not followed with the intended lead times.
The MFR emergency manager did describe the principal infrastructure damage and
difficulties that a hurricane would cause. Infrastructure damage would include loss of power,
communication failures, flooded roadways, and a shortage of water, fuel, and food. His
description revealed that even if the MFR headquarters is operable, MFR personnel would
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find it difficult to come to work if no evacuation is ordered. The ability of the MFR to
continue operations if no evacuation occurs would depend on MFR’s ability to resupply
its generators and the status of local infrastructure. The Feedback section describes this
scenario if a user does not evacuate and hurricane strikes New Orleans. In this manner,
the HDS provides a qualitative description of the non-monetary consequences.
4. Benefits of Simulation Tool
The MFR has begun to use the HDS in its individual and team-based hurricane preparation
exercises. Their experiences show the value of the HDS in improving MFR’s hurricane
preparation training and decision processes by:
• increasing the number of simulated storms they experience, at lower cost;
• focusing training on uncertainty and ambiguity inherent in the decision process; and
• improving MFR personnel’s understanding of the forecast products.
These improvements in the training process, provided in a realistic environment with
rich, specific, decision-dependent feedback, can be expected to reduce known biases in
decision-making under uncertainty. This section also discusses the challenges to quantifying
decision quality in this context and the opportunities that the HDS provides for studying
dynamic decisions under uncertainty.
4.1. Experience more simulated storms
The MFR holds two group hurricane preparation exercises per year. In the spring, a func-
tional exercise focuses on implementation of hurricane-preparation operations. The 40+
participants are mid-level to senior-level officers responsible for functional areas includ-
ing personnel, operations, and logistics. In this exercise, MFR units perform some of the
actions that they would need to undertake during a hurricane. An August exercise brings
together more senior participants—principals and deputies from various directorates—for
a tabletop exercise focusing on decision making. The primary purposes of the August exer-
cise are to validate the decision timelines and to demonstrate the tension between wanting
to evacuate Marines as soon as possible in the event of a hurricane and the high financial
and other costs of evacuation.
Before the development of the HDS, each exercise centered around one simulated storm
which the MFR’s Emergency Management Program Specialist developed using composites
of historical storms or transpositions of historical storms to different locations. He created
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each storm and its forecasts and injected updates periodically during the exercise to rep-
resent the progress of the storm. In 2016, the MFR used the HDS for its August exercise
in place of a hand-created scenario, saving approximately 30 hours of preparation time.15
In addition, the HDS enabled the participants to experience two storms in the exercise,
rather than just one as in prior years. MFR leadership plans to continue using the HDS
for both of its annual group exercises (J. Garcia, personal communication, September 14,
2016).
Because the HDS provides a scenario in seconds, it creates the opportunity for individual
training. Individual users can experience a career’s worth of threatening storms in a day,
with the current forecast products and in the context of the MFR preparation timeline.
MFR leadership has asked its Crisis Action Team and ERS, approximately 70 people, to
continue to practice with the HDS on an individual basis to become more familiar with
the forecasting products, the uncertainty, and the evolution of the uncertainty as lead
time declines (J. Garcia, personal communication, September 14, 2016). This is additional
training that was not available before the HDS.
4.2. Focus on decision making with uncertainty
In addition to providing the opportunity to experience many more storms at a lower cost,
the feedback from MFR indicates that the HDS focused users on why and when a decision
might be taken while considering a realistic level of uncertainty. Marines are accustomed
to making decisions that follow a prescribed timeline based on “cold, hard facts,”16
but the HDS demonstrated the inherent uncertainty in hurricane forecasting and the
difficulty in balancing the trade-offs:
“...in 2015 ... the exercise focused more on reviewing operations and the timeline in
our decision support matrix. This year, with the simulator, we focused the exercise
more on the difficult decisions and how the uncertainty and ambiguity reflects real-life
situations.” (R.W. Mantzel, personal communication, October 4, 2016)
The hand-generated storms used in prior years frequently followed a pattern of increas-
ing threat over the course of the storm, which the MFR exercise participants came to
anticipate. Therefore, they were not exposed to the degree or type of uncertainty inherent
15 J. Garcia, MFR Emergency Management Program Specialist, personal communication, September 14, 2016.
16 Col. R.W. Mantzel, MFR Operations and Plans Officer, who directs the Crisis Action Team, personal communi-
cation, September 1, 2016.
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in real storms. In the HDS, storms sometimes change direction, lose intensity as they reach
the coast, and form close to shore in the Gulf—all behavior that is realistic but infrequent
enough that most staff have never experienced it. The HDS
“provided insight into the ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in hurricanes. We would
like a hurricane to follow a predictable path, but hurricanes in reality have unpre-
dictable paths. ... The simulator reflects this real-life behavior ... and improves our
understanding of what can happen with storms in the Gulf of Mexico.” (R.W. Mantzel,
personal communication, October 4, 2016)
Experiencing many realistic storms within the HDS can be expected to reduce common
biases that occur in decision making with uncertainty. For example, outcome bias tends
to cause judgements of decision quality to depend too much on outcome, rather than on
the appropriateness of judgements under uncertainty (Baron and Hershey 1988). For low-
probability events, such as a hurricane striking New Orleans, people tend to underestimate
the likelihood because they are unlikely to have experienced the event (Hertwig et al. 2004).
More experience—provided by the HDS—increases the likelihood that the low-probability
event will be experienced, making the judgement of its likelihood more realistic.
4.3. Understand forecast products
Training with the HDS and the elevation of uncertainty as an important focus affected the
way participants in the MFR exercises used and interpreted the forecast products. They
relied more on the wind-speed probability forecasts rather than on the track forecast cone:
“We tend to view the forecast with the shaded cone as certain, meaning that we
think the storm will never move outside the shaded cone. Relying completely on the
cone gives a false sense of security because if New Orleans is outside of the cone,
we might think New Orleans is safe. But the hurricane can deviate outside of that
cone and destructive weather can occur outside the cone. ... For example, even though
New Orleans might be outside of the cone, the simulator might depict a 20% chance
that hurricane-force winds will reach New Orleans. This provided an important point
of discussion and clarification for us during the table-top exercise.” (R.W. Mantzel,
personal communication, October 4, 2016)
As discussed in Section 2.2, misinterpretations of the NHC cone are common. Perception
and interpretation of information is one of the layers of error that commonly reduces the
quality of judgements, and reducing the mismatch between the informational products and
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their interpretation improves judgements (Stewart 2001). The HDS improved users’ inter-
pretation of the forecast track, cone and wind-speed probability products, and therefore
can be expected to improve their judgements about hurricane risk.
The participants in the August tabletop exercise noted learning other important relation-
ships between the forecast products and their hurricane preparation operations. Tropical-
storm force winds commonly arrive 12 or more hours before the center of the storm, which
was not universally understood among the key staff at MFR before the HDS. Tropical-
storm force winds pose a hazard for personnel who are on the roads; therefore it is important
to complete all travel well before the arrival of 39-mph winds. In addition, the timing of the
storm relative to normal waking hours is very important. If the storm’s winds are forecast
to reach New Orleans in the early evening, the Commander and the Crisis Action Team
can meet first thing in the morning, give the order to evacuate, and ensure the Marines are
evacuated safely in the morning and early afternoon. If the storm’s winds are forecast to
reach New Orleans in the early afternoon, evacuating the headquarters is logistically more
difficult because the order to evacuate would be given in the late afternoon of the previous
day at which time many people would have already returned home. The MFR needs to be
prepared for both possibilities.
4.4. Evaluating the effectiveness of HDS
The MFR senior staff’s feedback and the authors’ own observations and informed con-
clusions indicate that the HDS has been highly effective in improving hurricane training,
increasing decision-relevant learning by the participants. Providing further evidence of its
value, the MFR plans to make the HDS available to its Reserve Training Centers, many of
which are located in hurricane-prone regions, including Jacksonville, Tampa, and Hialeah,
Florida; and Galveston and Corpus Christi, Texas (J. Garcia, personal communication,
September 14, 2016).
Ideally, we could assess the effectiveness of the HDS by comparing the MFR’s decisions
during tropical cyclones before using the HDS and real decisions made after using the
HDS. However, real-world decision quality before and after using the HDS cannot be
meaningfully compared for a number of reasons. The sample size of real storms is tiny
and highly variable with respect to storm impacts and forecasts, as detailed in Section 2.2.
Other sources of variability that cannot be controlled for include ongoing changes in NHC
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forecast products and the characteristics of the individuals participating in the decision
such as their prior tropical-storm experiences.
A further challenge in measuring the effectiveness of the HDS is defining good decision
performance or even good outcomes. The relative importance of financial impacts, dis-
ruption of operations, and personnel safety can change year-to-year, month-to-month, and
even day-to-day as the threats and budget change. For example, the impact of spending
$2 million of the operations and support budget changes depending on the timing in the
fiscal year and upcoming demands. The tolerance for risking reduced mission capability is
sensitive to changing threats that the MFR Commander may be tracking. Using expected
monetary equivalent of all consequences, as in Taylor (2007) is unrealistic. Decisions that
are appropriate in one instance may not be appropriate in every similar storm.
The above-described complexity in hurricane preparation at MFR creates obstacles to
assessing users’ decision performance. Reducing the HDS’s complexity would reduce its
effectiveness. The HDS was designed to respond to the MFR’s requirement for a rich
and realistic environment, and as noted in Ward et al. (2006)’s review, high performance
associated with expertise is highly task-specific, and the performance benefit associated
with expertise is smaller in less realistic environments. In other words, the more realistic
the task environment, the less we can learn from experiments, while the more stylized the
simulated environment, the less applicable the learning is to the real environment.
A stylized version of the HDS could be used as a tool for studying dynamic decision
making under uncertainty. This requires constructing a scenario within which it is possible
to identify better and worse choices and/or outcomes. Results using such a stylized sim-
ulator may not be generalizable to real decisions, however. One reason is that the stakes
are very high in real decisions, while in the simulator they are low. Levitt and List (2007)
cite numerous studies showing that the magnitude of the stakes in laboratory experiments
has a significant impact on behavior in studies of pro-social behavior. Moreover, outcome
bias in assigning blame (McGraw et al. 2011) would tend to increase the stakes relative
to the direct utility impact of financial costs, mission disruption, and health and welfare
impacts in the real-world scenario. Therefore decisions that users make in the low-stakes
HDS environment may not reflect their behavior in real, high-stakes decisions. The docu-
mented improved understanding of forecast products and their associated uncertainty as
a result of using the HDS will allow MFR to make better-informed risk judgments.
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5. Conclusions
Louisiana has a long hurricane history, and the two critical Marine Commands headquar-
tered in New Orleans need to be prepared to continue to operate and protect their personnel
in the event of a hurricane. In August 2016, Tropical Cyclone Hermine—later Hurricane
Hermine—appeared in the Gulf of Mexico, demonstrating the ongoing relevance of the
hurricane threat to the MFR.
Managing MFR operations in preparing for a hurricane requires a good understanding of
forecasts and forecast uncertainty, and how they interact with the organization’s decision
and implementation processes. The HDS enables MFR leaders to develop that ability
and make better operations management decisions when threatened by a hurricane, as
evidenced by the MFR’s experiences:
“The Hurricane Decision Simulator provides the Marines with an important tool that
we will continue to use to practice our preparation for hurricanes. . . . The simulator
helps us to manage our operations more effectively both in terms of training and in
readiness in the event that a hurricane hits New Orleans.” (R.W. Mantzel, personal
communication, October 4, 2016)
Because the simulated storms’ forecasts replicate recent NHC forecast error distribu-
tions, the HDS provides experience that is literally impossible to gain through real-world
experience, even for career hurricane experts. The fact that hurricanes occur relatively
rarely prevents emergency managers and decision makers from gaining experience with the
range of possible storm behavior and with the latest forecast products. Before the devel-
opment of the HDS, individuals would experience one or two simulated storms per year
during group exercises, about one hurricane threat per year, a hurricane approximately
every ten years and a major hurricane (Category 3 or higher) once every 23 years (Blake
et al. 2011). As the NHC updates its products, the HDS can be updated so that simulated
versions of the new products are available, providing the possibility of training in advance
on new NHC products.
The HDS provides a unique tool to help senior leaders practice making decisions in a
dynamic and uncertain environment. The HDS can also be modified to become a valuable
tool for civilian emergency responders and city and state officials who also need to make
high-stakes preparation decisions in advance of a hurricane. Other situations which require
quick decisions in dynamic and uncertain environments include responding to emergencies
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and natural disasters, military conflicts, and business disruptions. Developing simulations
that adequately capture both uncertainty and how it changes over time for these rare but
high-impact events can help senior decision makers be better prepared to deal with these
situations and successfully manage their organizations through a crisis.
While the MFR Commander does not face concerns regarding the public’s response to
evacuation orders, the dynamic decision with ever-changing considerations is very similar
to that faced by public officials and private-sector planners. Rather than seeking to model
all aspects of teh decision and develop optimized policy recommendations that are unlikely
to be directly prescriptive, the HDS serves to prepare the Commander and his staff to
operate in this challenging environment. Building on prior descriptive work on hurricane
preparation behavior and optimization models for preparation and evacuation timing, our
experience indivates that further development of tools to train judgmental decision making
could improve decisions and outcomes in this important and challenging context.
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